Abstract-Application markets offer more than 700'000 applications: music, movies, games or small tools. It appears more and more difficult to propose an automatic and systematic method to analyse all of these applications. Google Bouncer [1] tries to keep malicious applications out of Google Play by analysing uploaded applications to find known mal ware and malicious behaviours. However, Google Bouncer suffers from the same drawbacks of usual scan methods: it is inefficient to detect unknown malicious behaviour and it may be costly.
I. INTRODUCTION
During the last years, the use of information flow monitor ing and control on mobile environment has been booming. In In continuous works [5] , Yan et al. perform the same kind of studies for malware infecting Android platforms. However, in [4] , [5] , the environment in which the operating system runs is emulated. In [6] , we have designed and experimented a concrete and detailed information flow policy dedicated to mobile environment. For these experiments we have used Blarel, an information flow monitor able to intercept system calls in order to observe information exchanges in the whole operating system. In this work, we explore the use of information flow policies in order to achieve detection of malicious versions of applications.
More precisely, our proposal is structured around the three following points. First, we expect that developers of appli cations construct relevant flow policies for their applications and we propose here a semi-automatic method to help them.
Second, we propose that market owners publish and sign all information flow policies they have authorized on official markets. Third, when a user acquires an application, he enforces the companion flow policy using an information flow monitor. If a user inadvertently acquires a version of an application infected by a malware (from an unofficial market for instance), we suggest him to retrieve and to enforce the official version of the flow policy. This way if the unofficial application is infected by a mal ware, its malicious actions are detected by the information flow monitor. We claim that this protocol permits to detect only information flows induced by unofficial applications which reveal helpful to detect malicious information flows. The main problem lays in the construction of a precise and relevant informa tion flow policy. This paper explores a possible response to these problems and verifies its relevance. We use the Blare Security Policy Language (BSPL) a language that permits to specify precise flow policies [7] . BSPL permits to define precisely expected behaviour regarding sensitive pieces of information, and to compose several information flow policies.
In the following, we explore this proposed scenario. First, we briefly present the underlying information flow model (section II) and the corresponding monitor that is in charge of enforcing an information flow policy of the previous detailed model. In this work, policies are expressed in the BSPL language. We present the main features of this language and detail the implementation of a BSPL policy manager for android devices (section III). In section IV, we explain how taint graphs can help to automate the process of a flow-policy creation. Finally, in section V, we evaluate the effectiveness of the policies. More precisely, we test if the execution of an application causes alerts that violate its companion flow policy. We also test if the monitor succeeds in detecting malicious information flows induced by infected version of the same application.
To sum up, the contribution of this article is threefold: it presents a BSPL policy manager for android devices that permits to compose and apply information flow policies, it gives a semi-automatic method to build such policies, lastly it presents some experiments that evaluate efficiency of policies to cope with malware.
II. THE UNDERLYING INFORMATION FLOW MODEL
We conform here to the model of information flow policy previously detailed in [8] , [9] , [6] . In this model, an information flow policy is defined in three main steps.
The first step consists in defining the sensitive pieces of information that have to be protected in the environment.
A unique numerical identifier is associated to each of these pieces of information. The second step consists in defining in which information containers and with which other pieces of information these pieces of information are allowed to flow.
The policy is a set of pairs on the form (c, {{ill ... i1n} ... {im1 ... imn} }) where c is a container of information (which can be either a file, a socket, a process) and { {ill, ... i1n}, ... {im1, ... , imn}} is a set of sets of infor mation identifiers. A pair of this form expresses that any data computed from any piece of information that is a subset of a set appearing in {{ill, ... ,iln}, ... {iml, ... ,imn}} is allowed to flow into the container c. Such informa tion flow policies can be checked at system level using an information flow monitor as explained below. In this work we use the Blare monitor [6] , [9] , that uses two tags, namely itag and ptag, attached to each infor mation container. For a given container c, c. ita 9 is a set of information identifiers that expresses from which tainted content the current content of c has been computed.
c. ptag expresses the element of the policy that concerns c. In other words, if (c, {{ill, ... , i1n},··· {im1, ... , imn}} belongs to the information flow policy then c. ptag is equal to {{ill, ... , i1n}, ... {im1, ... , imn}} meaning that c is authorized to contain any non marked content or any mix of tainted data mentionned at least in a subset of {{ill, ... , hn}, ... , {im1, ... , imn}}. For instance, con sider that c is the process surfaceflinger and that surface flinger . ptag is equal to {{I, 2}{3}} where i is an information identifier associated with the android package file (APK) of an application i. If applications I and 3 request at the same time to draw something on the screen, then they will use the service surfaceflinger whose itag will thus contain at least {1,3}. This itag value is not included in any subset of surfaceflinger. ptag which will lead the monitor to raise an alert.
Blare monitors information flow occurring between infor mation containers at system level such as files, process, sock ets. Blare implementation is based on the LSM framework [10] that offers a way to completely capture information flows induced by system calls. Blare has also a set of hooks specific to Android that makes Blare precisely aware of information flows occurring inside the binder an Android specific Inter Process Communication mechanism.
In this work, we use the Blare Security Policy Language (BSPL for short) [7] to specify a policy. For that purpose we have developed a BSPL policy manager dedicated for android devices. Using BSPL, an application developer can define its own pieces of sensitive data and where they are allowed to flow. The developer is also requested to detail which mix of data he accepts in its own containers. Infor mation flow policies defined using BSPL can be verified, composed and applied in a Android device using the BSPL policy manager. To apply a policy, the BSPL policy manager computes and sets ptag on concerned files and applications.
Once applied, the Blare monitor is in charge of detecting any policy violation. In the following section, we present a BSPL policy manager dedicated to android devices.
III. BSPL POLICY MANAGER
BSPL is a xml based language that have been proposed in [7] whose main objective is to offer a clear, simple and univocal way to specify an information flow policy. A policy written in BSPL is composed of two main elements: the first element (called data_policy) identifies sensitive data that have to be protected, the second element (called container_policy) describes the information contain ers and which mix of sensitive data they are allowed to contain. Each application may define its own policy that will be composed with current policy which has itself been obtained from composition of the system policy and with policies of other applications previously installed on the device. BSPL defines a consistency property that expresses that if a mix of data is allowed to flow into a container then this container is also authorized to contain this mix of data.
In [7] , authors have shown that this property holds true for the composition of consistent policies.
We have developed a BSPL policy manager dedicated to Android operating system. The policy manager is an android application that involves a sqlite database used to store the current version of the policy enforced on the device (denoted by lP'). The database is initialized with a system policy that defines rules for default android containers. For instance, the system policy expresses that containers used to provide services are authorized to contain any tagged data, it could also expresses that some containers are forbidden to contain any tagged data. The policy is updated each time a new application having a companion policy is added to the system. The manager is able to verify that a given policy is consistent or not. If a policy is consistent it can be composed with lP' which leads to a new value of lP'. The policy manager makes some verifications on the policies before acceptance and composition. For instance, it verifies that a container (or similarly a sensitive piece of data) is uniquely defined.
Applications are thus unable to declare being the owners of containers or pieces of data that already exists on the system. In case of conflict during the policy composition, the less permissive choice is retained. Lastly, the policy manager is in charge of applying lP' on the device. The respect of the policy lP' is then ensured by Blare. Figure 1 presents the functional scheme of BSPL policy manager.
IV. DEFINING A BSPL POLICY USING TAINT GRAPH
An infonnation flow policy (as previously detailed) suffers from its advantage. On the one hand it offers a way to precisely describe legal and, implicitly, illegal information flows in a running operating system. On the other hand it seems to be impractical because of the difficulty to construct such policies for real applications. It can become time consuming for application developers as it requires a precise knowledge of how infonnation is used in the whole system.
To circumvent this limitation of the policy definition, we propose to build the flow policy of an application using its taint graph. Indeed, a taint graph gives a representation of how an application disseminates its own data in the system. We play the role of a developer who wants to construct a flow policy to make it approved on an official marketplace.
Once developed, the application is marked using a unused identifier and run on a smartphone monitored by Blare which logs all information flows that are engendered by syscalls and involve marked data. A log entry describes the pieces of sensitive information involved in the flow, its source and destination and is labelled with a timestamp. Source and destination are described by their type (file, process or socket), their name and their system identifier. From the log entries, we construct a taint graph that describes how a running code disseminates its own pieces of information in the operating system. The taint graph permits to construct the companion policy of the application since it exactly details which containers of information the application will contam inate. We have developed a small python script that parses the log file, compacts it into a taint graph and computes the derived policy. Even if information that can be retrieved from a taint graph is equivalent to information contained in the log file, a taint graph gives a more compact representation that is helpful to adjust the policy if needed. First, we generate the BSPL policy for a benign application. The resulting policy will be its companion flow policy. Before using this policy, we need to adapt it. Processes considered as legal containers of information from the application are only denoted by their name (e.g com. android. email) in the taint graph.
We thus need to specify the name of the corresponding executable files to set the tags properly.
The policy only declares one piece of sensitive data originating from the application apk file and lists all infor mation containers where these pieces of data are requested to flow. These containers are divided into two sets: those that belong to the application itself and those that belong to the system which are referenced as such. We have applied these guidelines on applications retrieved through Google Play Store. We construct the policy of each application separately. We install the application and mark its package (. apk file). In background, Blare monitors and logs the information flows occurring in the system. Once installed, we use the application during a learning period. During this learning period we launch all features offered to the user. We obtain a log having from 30000 to 60000 entries that leads More precisely, when Blare observes that an application exchanges data with one of these services, it considers that it retrieves at least any tainted data that were previously sent to the service. This over-approximation is too coarse for these two applications as they only propose services that do not permit any information exchange between two clients. Thus, not considering them as trusted may engender a lot of false positive. We claim that this choice is clearly legitimate for the application surface flinger since this process is in charge of drawing all user interfaces on the screen. The second process, servicemanager, holds references of all running services in the device. Any application that wishes to use a service thus has to ask for its reference to servicemanager. Due to its function in the system, servicemanager interacts with a lot of running application and engender a lot of false positives unless marked as trusted. We have considered during our experiments that servicemanager is trusted and do not disseminate information within the system. To sum up, surfaceflinger and servicemanager behave as wells for information flows. To sum up, we observed 0 alerts for the benign version 20J 39th International Conference on Information Assurance and Security (lAS) 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this presented paper we have proposed a new direction in defense against mal ware that pollutes application market.
Our proposal mainly relies on the definition of a precise information flow policy, namely the companion policy that have to be accepted and certified by official application markets. These companion policies are specified in the BSPL language and enforced using the Blare information flow monitor. We have implemented a policy manager that permits to compose BSPL policies and set them on a mobile device. We have also led some experiments that have shown the method efficiency to detect malicious versions of applications available on market places. In future works we plan to propose tools that will help market places to efficiently review submitted policies.
